This paper develops a trade model with firm-specific quality heterogeneity, limit pricing, and an endogenous distribution of markups. Exposure to trade induces only the firms producing high-quality (high-price) products to enter the export markets, whereas firms producing low-quality (low-price) products serve the domestic market in accordance to the Alchian and Allen (1964) conjecture. Trade liberalization intensifies the competition; causes firms producing low-quality products to exit the market; increases the number of products consumed in each country; raises national and global welfare; and generates quality upgrading that results in higher and average domestic and export markups. Interestingly, the laissez-faire equilibrium is inefficient, and this leaves room for welfare-improving government intervention.
Introduction
Several empirical studies have documented the presence of substantial firm heterogeneity in narrowly defined product categories. 1 According to these studies, firm heterogeneity takes the form of productivity differences among establishments or quality differences among narrowly defined product categories. Relatively more productive firms are larger, charge lower prices and are more likely to export successfully. Firms producing higher-quality products charge higher prices and are more likely to engage in exporting. Firms face large sunk costs of exporting; there is a large turnover among establishments and reallocation of resources within industries; and the degree of turnover is correlated with exporting activities.
These empirical findings have served as building blocks in the development of a growing strand of theoretical literature that has highlighted the nexus between firm heterogeneity and international trade patterns. Melitz (2003) was the first to develop a tractable model of monopolistic competition and firm heterogeneity based on productivity differences that took into account and generated predictions that are consistent with several aforementioned stylized facts. The theoretical framework proposed by Melitz has been extended by other studies to address the role of firm heterogeneity in several areas of international economics such as foreign direct investment, intersectoral trade flows and the gravity equation. 2 In addition, several recent studies have analyzed the nexus between trade, growth, and firm heterogeneity. 3 It would not be an exaggeration to state that we are witnessing the genesis of a new theory of intraindustry trade in markets characterized by firm heterogeneity.
The present paper contributes to the new theory by proposing a tractable model of monopolistic competition and trade in markets with firm-specific quality heterogeneity.
The production structure of the model follows closely Melitz's (2003) seminal work. Firms face uncertainty with respect to the future level of product quality when they engage in R&D to discover new products. This uncertainty is modeled by an unrestricted distribution of product quality levels. Production is characterized by constant marginal costs plus fixed production costs. Similarly, exporting involves fixed foreign-market entry costs plus per unit trade costs.
After a firm learns the quality of its product, it faces a unitary-elastic demand curve (which is derived from a Cobb-Douglas utility function) and a competitive fringe of potential imitators that can produce a generic, low-quality version of its product. 4 We assume that the firm competes against the fringe in a Bertrand fashion. Thus, the profit-maximizing strategy for the high-quality firm is to charge a limit price, which is proportional to the product quality level, and to drive the competitive fringe out of the market. Consequently, firms producing higher-quality products charge higher prices and markups, enjoy higher profits, and engage in exporting activities. In contrast, firms producing lower-quality products charge lower prices, earn lower profits, and serve only the domestic market.
Unlike the existing models with heterogeneous firms, trade in the present model affects the intensity of product market competition through the proliferation of varieties, which reduces consumer expenditure per variety and the quantity demanded for each brand.
This income effect hurts firms producing low-quality products more than firms producing high-quality products and generates a reallocation of resources from low-quality towards high-quality goods. The trade-induced reallocation of resources puts upward pressure on the real wage which reinforces the aforementioned income effect. Thus trade increases the "cutoff" (zero-profit) quality levels in the domestic and foreign markets and generates quality upgrading, more varieties available for consumption, and higher domestic and export markups.
The simultaneous presence of an income-based mechanism, variable markups, and variable input prices (the real wage) within the same model is missing from the rest of the literature. For instance, Melitz's (2003) model that relies on Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) preferences generates endogenous input prices but exogenous markups; whereas Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) rely on quasi-linear preferences to generate endogenous markups, but their model yields exogenous input prices and excludes by assumption the factor-market based mechanism that transmits the effects of trade liberalization.
Having developed a highly-tractable model of quality-heterogeneity and limit-pricing strategies, we analyze the effects of trade liberalization in a global economy consisting of many structurally identical countries. Trade liberalization can take a variety of forms given the rich structure of our model: a move from autarky to restricted trade, a reduction in trade costs, a reduction in foreign-market entry costs, or an increase in the size of the global economy measured by the number of trading partners. All these different facets of trade liberalization generate the same effects: an increase in the intensity of product market competition captured by a reduction in expenditure per variety; a reallocation of resources from low-quality to high-quality products which results in exit of inefficient firms; quality upgrading in the domestic and export markets; an increase in the number of products available for consumption in each country; an increase in average markups; and an improvement in national and global welfare.
The trade-induced rise in average markups does not mean that the intensity of competition declines, as would be the case in models where a typical firm faces variable price demand elasticity which transmits the intensity of product market competition and lowers the markup (see Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008) . In the present model, the elasticity of demand is equal to unity and each firm charges a limit price proportional to its quality level that yields a firm-specific constant markup. The trade-induced increase in average markups is a bi-product of the quality upgrading caused by the proliferation of varieties and the reduction in the quantity demanded for a typical variety. This novel aspect that relates quality upgrading and higher average markups is missing from the literature and complements the approach proposed by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) .
Despite the positive welfare impact of trade liberalization, the laissez-faire equilibrium is inefficient. This welfare property can be traced to the difference between the socially optimal and the market-equilibrium average markups. The social planner is interested in the welfare of the average consumer which depends on the average quality and the average consumer surplus, whereas the market is interested in the behavior of the marginal consumer which depends on the product with marginal quality. This difference yields the novel finding that the laissez faire "cutoff" quality levels of firms serving the domestic or foreign markets are socially suboptimal. Therefore, the combination of Cobb-Douglas preferences and limit-pricing strategies reveals the nature of welfare distortions and opens the door for welfare-improving policies in markets with heterogeneous firms. This welfare feature is consistent with the generalized theory of distortions and welfare and the qualityladders growth theory. However, it is not present in models with Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) preferences and heterogeneous firms. For instance, Feenstra and Kee (2008) use a multisector version of Melitz's model to establish that the laissez faire "cutoff" productivity levels of firms producing either for the domestic of foreign markets are socially optimal.
This property allows them to estimate a well defined GDP function using cross country data, but it also means that there is no room for desirable government intervention.
Several features of our model enjoy empirical support. Each surviving firm charges a price which is proportional to its product quality level. This feature is consistent with empirical studies that routinely use unit values to measure product quality (see, for instance, Schott (2004) , Hammels and Skiba (2004) , Hummels and Klenow (2005) , and Hallak (2006)). The prediction that the quality (and price) of exports is higher than the quality (and price) of products sold only in the domestic market provides a novel general-equilibrium explanation of the Alchian and Allen (1964, 74-75) conjecture of "shipping the good apples out." This prediction is consistent with the findings of Hummels and Skiba (1994) , Verhoogen (2008) , and Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) . Interestingly, models of productivity heterogeneity are inconsistent with the evidence on export unit values because they predict that more productive exporters charge lower prices than less productive non-exporters. 5 Finally, the prediction that trade-liberalization generates higher average markups in markets with vertical product differentiation raises a word of caution regarding empirical attempts to analyze the effects of trade liberalization on markups. Our result together with the main finding of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) , that trade liberalization generates lower markups, suggest that, without controlling for the nature of competition, one would expect to find an ambiguous effect of trade liberalization on industry markups. 6
Our paper is also related to a few studies that focus on firm heterogeneity and industry markups. Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) develop a model of heterogeneous firms, limit prices, and firm-specific Ricardian comparative advantage. Their model generates an exogenous distribution of markups and relies on an exogenous number of varieties.
In contrast, our model delivers an endogenous distribution of markups, an endogenous number of varieties, and a different resource-reallocation mechanism. As mentioned earlier, Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) develop a model of productivity heterogeneity, quasi-linear preferences, and trade between two unequal-size countries. Their model generates endogenous markups and addresses similar questions to those addressed in our paper. However, in their model the wage is fixed by the presence of the outside good, production and exporting do not involve fixed costs, markets are segmented, and it is not clear how quality heterogeneity can be introduced without substantially complicating the analysis. Despite these differences, both models predict that trade liberalization intensifies the product market competition through variety proliferation in our model and through changes in the price 5 See, for instance, Schott (2004, p. 676) who states that "unit-value patterns are inconsistent with new trade theory models that have producer price varying inversely with producer productivity."
6 The study by Harrison (1994) illustrates this point. Using plant-level data from Cote d'Ivoire, she explores changes in productivity and markups following a 1985 trade liberalization episode. She finds that productivity increased, but price-cost markups fell only in few sectors and increased in others following the reform. According to Harrison (1994, Table 5 ) markups, measured as profits over sales, increased in five out of nine sectors and fell in the rest. elasticity of demand in theirs. Our findings, therefore, complement their analysis by revealing the positive effects of trade liberalization on markups in markets where firms adopt limit-price strategies and compete with each other in a Bertrand fashion. Finally, Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) propose a model of quality heterogeneity based on Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) preferences where each firm's marginal costs increase in the quality of the firm's product. Their model predicts that high-quality and high-price products will be exported, as in our model, but delivers constant markups.
In summary, our paper makes three novel contributions to the literature on firm heterogeneity and trade. First, it builds a simple model of quality-based firm heterogeneity and trade with limit-pricing strategies, variable markups, and a variable real wage. This allows the study of the impact of trade that is transmitted through both the intensity of productmarket competition and the real wage. This general-equilibrium mechanism is missing from other related studies. Second, the model offers several empirically relevant predictions on the pattern and impact of trade in markets with quality-heterogeneous firms. These predic- 
The Model
In this section, we present the basic elements of the model regarding consumer preferences, structure of production, and firm entry decisions. We consider a global economy consisting of n + 1 structurally identical countries with n 1. Each economy has a single industry populated by heterogeneous firms, and labor is the only factor of production. In each country, the aggregate supply of labor, L, is fixed and remains constant over time.
Consumer Preferences
Consumer preferences are identical across all countries and modeled by the following CobbDouglas utility function defined over a continuum of products indexed by ω
where β > 0 is a constant, λ(ω) denotes the time-invariant product quality, q(ω) is the aggregate consumption of brand ω, and Ω is the set of varieties available for consumption in a typical country. We focus our analysis on the case where each consumer buys all available varieties, that is, we assume that the non-satiation principle holds. This case arises if parameter β is sufficiently high to ensure that the utility increases monotonically in the mass of varieties consumed. 7
Maximizing (1) subject to the budget constraint yields the standard Cobb-Douglas demand for a typical variety
where E is per-capita consumer expenditure, L is the number of consumers in a typical (home or foreign) market, p(ω) is the corresponding price of brand ω, and M c is the measure of Ω (i.e., the mass of varieties available for consumption). The market demand for a product increases in aggregate consumer expenditure EL; and decreases in price p(ω) and the number of available products M c .
Production
There is a continuum of firms, each choosing to produce a different product variety. Labor is the only factor of production, with each worker supplying one unit of labor. Production involves both fixed and variable costs: in order to produce q units of output, = f p + q units of labor are required independently of the level of quality, where f p denotes the fixed overhead cost of production measured in units of labor. Without any loss of generality, this formulation assumes that the marginal cost of production is equal to the wage of labor.
Firms wishing to export must incur per-unit trade costs and fixed costs as in Melitz (2003) . Iceberg trade costs (such as transport costs and tariffs) are modeled in the standard fashion: τ > 1 units of output must be produced at home in order for one unit to arrive at its destination. In addition, exporting involves a fixed foreign-market-entry cost of F x > 0 that does not depend on the firm's quality level or the geographic location of production.
This cost covers the costs of setting a distribution system, collecting information about the foreign market demand, product modifications and adjustments to local tastes, and costs based on regulations imposed by governments. 8 The decision to export occurs after the product's quality is revealed.
Each incumbent firm faces a constant probability of death δ in each period. In the present context, this stochastic shock can be interpreted as adverse changes in tastes that eliminate the demand for a particular variety. Consequently, in the steady-state, each firm is indifferent in principle between paying f x = δF x in each period and the one-time fixed cost F x in the first period of its existence. Hereafter, we assume that in each period exporters face an overhead fixed cost f x in addition to the overhead production cost f p . Firms that serve only the domestic market face just the overhead production cost f p .
Next, consider the optimal pricing decision of a firm selling a brand of quality λ in its home market. Because each brand is associated with a unique quality level, in what follows we label products based on their quality levels. The aggregate quantity demanded is given by equation (2), which implies that that expenditure per variety, p(λ)q(λ), is independent of the brand's quality level. Because the elasticity of demand for each variety is unity, a typical firm has an incentive to charge an infinite price and produce an infinitesimally small quantity independently of the product's quality level. To prevent this from happening and to create an endogenous distribution of markups, we follow the spirit of Schumpeterian growth theory and assume that once a product is introduced in a market (domestic or foreign), a generic, lower-quality version of the product can be produced instantaneously by a competitive fringe of firms. The production of each generic product exhibits constant returns to scale with one unit of labor producing one unit of output. We suppose that the generic version of a product cannot be produced in a country unless the original product is sold there. In other words, the technology to produce generics diffuses internationally through imports. 9 We normalize the quality level of each generic good to one independently of the quality level of the copied product and the location of production.
Denote with p d (λ) and p x (λ) the consumer price prevailing in the domestic and foreign markets respectively, and assume that competition within each product occurs in a Bertrand fashion. The possibility of costless imitation forces firms to maximize profits by charging a (limit) price no higher than p d (λ) = p x (λ) = λw, where w is the common wage rate across all countries, hereafter normalized to unity. This optimal pricing rule drives domestic and foreign imitators out of the market and implies that firms with higher-quality products 9 Alternatively, one can assume that once a product is developed, its low-quality generic version can be produced by a competitive fringe in all countries, i.e., technology diffuses instantly across all countries. Analysis based on this assumption yields qualitatively the same results, and is available upon request. Moreover, one can also assume that there is no international transfer of technology. This assumption would allow exporters to charge a higher price abroad that would be proportional to the product's quality level adjusted by per-unit trade costs. More precisely, in the absence of international technology transfer, the quality leader charges two limit prices: p d (λ) = λ in the domestic market to get rid of the competitive fringe; and (in the absence of a competitive foreign fringe) it charges an export limit price px(λ) = τ λ which prevents the domestic fringe from exporting. In this case, all the results go through with the exception that trade costs do not affect the export cutoff quality level. charge higher prices. 10
The limit-pricing rule
which means that firms with higher-quality products charge higher prices and sell lower quantities. In addition, it is obvious from (2) that all firms earn the same revenue p(λ)q(λ) = EL/M c , thanks to Cobb-Douglas preferences.
The per-period profits of exporting firms can be decomposed into two parts: profits earned from domestic sales π d (λ), and profits earned from sales in each of n export markets
where the quantities demanded by domestic and foreign consumers q d (λ) and q x (λ) are given by (2) and
It is important to emphasize that, as the Melitz model, our approach is isomorphic to a model of process innovations, where firm heterogeneity is derived from productivity differences. The Appendix establishes formally that the latter yields the profit functions described by (4) and (5), an endogenous distribution of markups, and the property that more productive firms charge lower prices and produce more output. In summary, the combination of Cobb-Douglas preferences and limit-pricing strategies generates an endogenous distribution of markups that is missing from models that rely on Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) preferences. 11
We present the main results of our analysis using the quality (as opposed to productivity) version of the model in order to directly relate and compare our findings to the theoretical and empirical literature that focuses on product quality as a determinant of the pattern of intraindustry trade. 12 One caveat of our model is that, under Cobb-Douglas preferences, the revenue per variety is independent of the firm's quality level and price. Another possible caveat (subject to the qualification in footnote 8) is that under limit-pricing each firm charges the same price in all markets independently of per-unit trade costs. These implications are clearly unrealistic. However, as in quality-ladders growth models, CobbDouglas preferences deliver surprising tractability and preserve several desirable aggregate properties.
Notice that symmetry of foreign markets implies that the global profit flow generated by exporting equals nπ x (λ). Because only a fraction of incumbent firms export, a firm producing a good with quality λ earns a per-period profit
Since each firm faces a constant probability of death δ in each period, the market value of a typical firm is given by
where the second equality follows from the fact that each firm's product quality remains constant during its lifetime.
A product of quality λ is produced only if π(λ) 0. Therefore, the production cutoff quality level λ p is determined as follows. Equation (4) implies that π d (λ) increases in λ,
Thus, for any given values of f p > 0, E, and M c (which are common to all firms), there exists a production cutoff quality level λ p , such that all firms producing varieties with quality λ λ p earn non-negative profits and stay in the market.
Firms that know how to produce varieties with quality below the production cutoff quality level λ p exit the market. Setting (4) equal to zero generates the following production cutoff quality level
The production cutoff quality level λ p depends positively on production fixed costs f p , and negatively on its market size EL/M c . This makes sense: in markets with high fixed production costs or low expenditure per variety, only high-quality (high-price) products can earn non-negative profits.
A product with quality λ is exported to all foreign markets, only if π x (λ) 0. Equation (5) implies that, as long as λ > τ > 1 holds, π x (λ) increases monotonically in λ, and that
Therefore, for any f x 0, E, and M c there exists a cutoff quality level λ x τ, such that all firms producing products with quality λ λ x earn non-negative profits from exporting to any foreign market. However, firms that produce varieties with quality λ < λ x face strictly negative foreign profits and do not export. Setting (5) equal to zero yields the following export cutoff quality level
The export cutoff quality level λ x depends positively on factors (such as variable trade costs τ and foreign-market entry costs f x ) that adversely affect profits from exporting; and negatively on factors (such as foreign market size EL/M c ) that have a positive impact on export profits.
Solving (7) for EL/M c and substituting the resulting expression in (8) yields
Equation (9), together with the restrictions imposed by (7) and (8), establishes the dependence of the exporting cutoff quality level λ x on the production cutoff quality level λ p and the model's parameters. The requirement that the denominator of (9) must be non-negative
. Inspection of (9) also indicates that λ x is a monotonically increasing function of the production cutoff quality level λ p ∈ (1, k), the level of per-unit trade costs τ, and the ratio of overhead fixed costs
Therefore, under the parameter restrictions f x f p and τ > 1, the exporting cutoff quality level λ x is strictly greater than the production cutoff quality level λ p . In this case, firms whose product quality level is less than λ p exit; firms whose product quality level is λ ∈ [λ p , λ x ) produce exclusively for the domestic market because they earn non-negative profits from the domestic operations only;
and firms producing high-quality products (λ λ x ) sell their products in both domestic and all foreign markets.
A sufficient condition for the partition of firms by export status is that the overhead costs of operating in the domestic market f p must not exceed the overhead costs of entering a foreign market f x . A similar condition has been derived by Melitz (2003 Melitz ( , p. 1709 for the case of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) preferences. However, in Melitz's model, no level of trade costs τ can generate the aforementioned partitioning in the absence of exporting fixed costs (f x = 0). In contrast, the present model generates this partitioning due to the limitpricing behavior of firms. Notice that, in the absence of fixed exporting costs, equation (9) yields λ x = τ. In addition, observe that as the level of production fixed costs approaches zero (f p → 0) equation (7) yields λ p → 1. By continuity, the present model can deliver the partition of firms by export status under sufficiently high trade costs combined with low production fixed costs. This property leads to a novel prediction: a firm facing foreign markets with sufficiently different trade costs will not export to markets with high trade
This prediction is consistent with the empirical findings of Schott (2004, figure 2) and 13 This possibility is illustrated with the following simple example. Consider the case of a firm producing a product with quality λ and facing two foreign markets, one with a low per-unit trade costs τ 0 and one with high per-unit trade costs τ1 such that 1 < τ0 < λ < τ1. In addition, assume that production and exporting fixed costs are equal to zero (f p = f x = 0). It is obvious from equations (4) and (5) that this firm earns positive profits in the domestic market and in the low-trade-costs market, but strictly negative profits in the high-trade-costs market and will not export to the latter. Similar considerations apply to the model of productivity heterogeneity and quasi-linear preferences developed by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) . Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) . The former study uses U.S. product level data and reports that in 1994 about 90 percent of ten-digit HS product categories and almost 80 percent of 4-digit SITC categories exhibited zero imports! The second study argues that trade costs are positively correlated with the absence of U.S. exports in narrowly defined product categories. Models of firm heterogeneity that rely on Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) preferences cannot generate this prediction, thanks to constant markup pricing across all varieties.
The following proposition summarizes the aforementioned analysis. Proposition 1 implies that firms with high-quality products charge higher prices, enjoy higher profits and ship these products abroad in accordance to the Alchian and Allen (1964) conjecture, which has been confirmed empirically by Hammels and Skiba (2004) . Our paper develops a general equilibrium model in which trade costs and self-selection among heterogeneous firms lead to the desired result.
Entry Decision
The determination of the production cutoff quality level depends on entry and exit considerations. We assume that there is a large number of prospective and ex-ante identical entrants. Each entrant faces a fixed entry cost f e > 0, which is measured in units of labor and interpreted as the number of R&D researchers employed by the entrant to discover a new variety. After a firm incurs the fixed entry cost, it draws its quality parameter λ from a common and known distribution g(λ) with positive support over (0, ∞) and with continuous cumulative distribution G(λ). The properties of g(λ) determine the benefits of entry measured by the relevant expected discounted profits.
The ex-ante probability of drawing a quality level λ is governed by the density function g(λ) and the ex-ante probability of successful entry 1 − G(λ p ). As in Melitz (2003) , the ex-post distribution of product quality levels µ is the conditional distribution of g(λ) on the
The ex-ante probability that an incumbent firm will export is given by
In addition, the law of large numbers implies that ζ x equals the ex-post fraction of incumbent firms that export.
Let M p denote the mass of varieties (and firms) produced in any country and M x be the number of varieties that each country exports. Then, we have M x = ζ x M p , which further ensures that M c = (1 + nζ x )M p is the the mass of products available for consumption in any country. Armed with the aforementioned probability distributions, one can calculate the aggregate quantities demanded:
where
That is,λ p is the weighted harmonic mean of the quality levels (and prices) of all produced goods and can be interpreted as the average (expected) quality level. Similarly,λ x is the weighted harmonic mean of the quality levels of a country's exports and can be interpreted as the average export quality.
Because the production cutoff quality level is the minimum quality level of all surviving products, it must be lower than the average quality level. Moreover, an increase in λ p forces producers with low-quality products to exit the market, which in turn increases the average quality level of all produced varieties. The same intuition applies to the relationship between the export quality cutoff level and the average quality of exports. The following lemma summarizes these properties (see Appendix for proof). 
where first and second terms correspond to the domestic and foreign demand for a typical variety, respectively. Consequently, the ex-ante per-period profit of a typical prospective entrant is given bȳ
Because the probability of successful entry is 1 − G(λ p ), the net benefits of entering the domestic market are equal to the expected value of a firm [1 − G(λ p )]ν, whereν =π/δ is the ex-ante value of a prospective entrant. Setting the benefits of entry equal to the fixed R&D costs yields the free-entry condition
whereπ is defined by (15). This concludes the description of the model.
Steady-State Equilibrium
This section determines the market cutoff quality levels, number of varieties, the average markups, and the welfare level in a typical country. Substituting (9) and (11) in (15) yields an expression for ex-ante profits that depends only on the two cutoff quality levels. Further substitution ofπ into the free-entry condition (16) yields the basic steady-state equilibrium condition
where H is defined as
The export cutoff quality level λ x is an increasing function of λ p (see equation (9)). In addition, the Appendix proves that H is strictly decreasing in cutoff levels and that the left-hand-side of equation (17) is also decreasing in λ p ∈ (1, k). The above considerations imply the following result (see Appendix for proof).
There exist a unique production and a unique export cutoff quality levels λ p ∈ (1, k) and λ x ∈ (τ, ∞) which satisfy equations (9) and (17) The aggregate demand for labor in a typical market equals the aggregate supply of
where L p denotes the total amount of labor employed in the production of surviving goods and Π is the level of aggregate profits earned by all producers.
In addition, the standard GDP identity implies that the total wage bill must be equal to the aggregate expenditure on all goods produced wL p + wL e = EL. Therefore, per-capita expenditure equals unity due to the choice of labor as the numeraire, i.e., E = w = 1.
Substituting E = 1 in (7) yields the mass of products available for consumption M c
Substituting 14 the relationship M c = (1 + nζ x )M p into (19) yields the mass of varieties produced in each country
14 We can now derive a sufficient condition which guarantees that the consumer consumes all available varieties. In principle, each consumer chooses q(ω) (the quantity of each variety) and M (the number of varieties) to maximize (1) subject to the budget constraint. Notice that in the absence of trade (n = 0) the mass of varieties produced equals the mass of varieties consumed, i.e., M c = M p .
As we mentioned in the introduction, the model generates an endogenous distribution of markups. Each incumbent firm charges a price equal to its quality level p(λ) = λ, and therefore its markup measured by the price marginal-cost margin as given by (p − 1)/p = 1 − λ −1 . Subsequently, the aggregate markup over all incumbents equals
Similarly, an exporter charges a price p(λ) = λ, incurs a marginal cost τ, and earns a price marginal-cost margin (p − τ )/p = 1 − τ λ −1 .
Thus the aggregate export markup is
Consequently, the average production (domestic) and export markups are given by
whereλ p andλ x are defined by (13). Both average markups increase in the production cutoff quality level λ p (see Proposition 1), but the average export markup decreases in the level of trade costs τ.
One can obtain an expression for per capita welfare as follows. Substituting the percapita quantity demanded q(λ)/L = E/λM c for each variety into the utility function of a typical consumer (1) and performing the integration yields
where per-capita expenditure E is set equal to unity due to the choice of labor as the To unveil the intuition for the welfare expression notice that an increase in M c has two conflicting welfare effects. First, each consumer becomes better off because she consumes more products. Second, she becomes worse off as her expenditure, which is equal to her wage, spreads among more varieties. Limit pricing renders the consumer indifferent between receiving q units of a generic product with quality 1 and q/λ units of a good with quality λ at a higher price p(λ) = λ, and thus the average quality does not appear directly as an argument in the welfare function. Higher average quality allows firms to reduce the demand for manufacturing labor by charging a higher price and producing less quantity per variety.
This, in turn, means that the economy can afford the production of more varieties and enjoy a higher welfare level.
The Impact of International Trade
The Formally, the effects of trade liberalization are transmitted through changes in the production cutoff quality level λ p as are described in Lemma 2 (see Appendix for proof).
Lemma 2. Trade liberalization, captured by an increase in the number of trading partners (n ↑), a reduction in per-unit transport costs (τ ↓), or a reduction in foreign-market entry costs (f x ↓), increases the production cutoff quality level
and ∂λ p /∂f x < 0).
The economic intuition behind Lemma 2 is as follows. For any initial value of the production cutoff quality level λ p , the export cutoff quality level λ x and the mass of varieties consumed M c are fixed (see equations (9) and (19)). Equation (9) and Lemma 1 imply that a decline in τ or f x increases the average quality of exportsλ x . Therefore, any form of trade liberalization (n ↑, τ ↓, or f x ↓) increases the ex-ante profitsπ (see equation (15) and raises the demand for labor for any wage level (see equation (16) and, in particular, equation (17)).
The excess demand for labor induces a reallocation of resources from low-quality products towards high-quality products that translates into a larger mass of products available for consumption M c . To see this, recall that for any level of expenditure, a firm with a higher quality product charges a higher price, produces less output, and employs less labor than a firm with a lower quality product (see equation (3)). Thus any given aggregate supply of labor can sustain more higher-quality products.
The reallocation of resources from lower to higher-quality products increases the demand for varieties and intensifies the product market competition by reducing the demand for each product as the aggregate expenditure EL is spread among more varieties. Consequently, the flow of profits of the marginal firm, which produces a product with the cutoff quality level λ p , become negative, and induce an increase in the production cutoff quality level to restore the zero-profit condition (7) that determines λ p . An increase in the production cutoff quality level λ p , caused by trade liberalization, generates quality upgrading (measured by an increase in the average quality) and increases the average markup by shifting resources from low to high-quality products. Consequently, in the present model, trade liberalization operates primarily through the increased intensity of product-market competition and the associated increase in the mass of sustainable products (as opposed to a reduction in markups).
The next step of the analysis is to establish the impact of trade liberalization on markups, on the number of varieties consumed, and on welfare. First, consider the impact of trade liberalization on the intensity of product-market competition captured by the domestic and export markups defined by (21). Any type of trade liberalization increases λ p and λ x (from Lemmas 1 and 2) and increases both domestic and export markups (see equation (21)). In addition, inspection of equation (19) and Lemma 2 establish that any form of trade liberalization increases the production cutoff quality level λ p and the mass of varieties available for consumption M c in every country. Finally, differentiating equation (22) 
c. and has a positive effect on national and global welfare (U ↑).
Next consider an extreme form of trade liberalization: the move from autarky to (restricted) trade. The closed-economy steady-state equilibrium corresponds to the case of no trading partners (i.e., n = 0). Equation (17) then implies that, under autarky, the production cutoff quality level λ A p is determined by H(λ p , 1) = δf e /f p , and is strictly less than the open-economy cutoff quality level λ p : the absence of export markets reduces the benefits of entry and shifts labor from the production of higher-quality products towards the production of lower-quality products. Observe that equations (19), (21), and (22) 
, and the level of welfare (
which are all functions of the production cutoff quality level. Therefore, a move from autarky to trade has the same qualitative impact as an increase in the number of trading partners n. These effects are summarized in the following proposition. 
Welfare Properties
The presence of quality-heterogeneous firms raises the following welfare question: does the market provide the socially optimal quality cutoff levels, markups, and the mass of available varieties? The constrained optimality (in the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) sense, where firms make non negative profits) of the cutoff productivity levels has been demonstrated in a multisector version of the Melitz model by Feenstra and Kee (2008) . This is a surprising result considering the presence of potential welfare distortions caused by imperfect competition, trade costs, and heterogeneous productivity levels.
Contrary to the existing literature on trade with heterogeneous firms, the present model generates the possibility of divergence between the socially optimal and laissez-faire equilibrium due to the endogenous distribution of markups. In order to minimize the algebra, we illustrate this possibility in a closed-economy setting noting that similar considerations ap-
ply to an open economy, where trade costs create additional welfare distortions. The social planner maximizes per-capita utility function U = M c ln(βE/M c ) subject to the resource constraint. Since labor is the only factor of production, the resource constraint requires that at each instant in time labor is fully employed. The aggregate supply of labor L is fixed, whereas the aggregate demand for labor consists of two components: labor employed
, where the mass of varieties produced equals the mass of varieties consumed (M p = M c ); and labor employed in production. The latter is derived as follows. Since one unit of labor produces one unit of output, each surviving firm hires f p +q(λ) workers, where f p is the production fixed cost expressed in units of labor and q(λ) is the demand for a product of quality λ given by (2). Thus the labor employed in
The social planner maximizes U = M c ln(βE/M c ) subject to (23) with respect to the production cutoff quality level λ p , per-capita expenditure E, and the mass of varieties available for consumption M c . Denoting with ψ the Lagrangian multiplier, one can write the corresponding first-order conditions as follows.
(λ
1/ψ =λ
These conditions determine the socially optimum values of λ p , E, and M c . Equation (25) implies that the Lagrangian multiplier must be positive (ψ > 0).
We can obtain further insights on the solution to the social planner's problem by substituting (25) into (26) and equating the resulting expression to (24) to obtain
Since the average quality levelλ p is a function of the cutoff quality level λ p , equations (24) and (27) How does the socially optimum solution compare to the closed-economy market equilibrium? Set the number of trading partners n equal to zero in (15) and substitute the resulting expression forπ and f p from condition (7) into (16) to obtain the closed-economy free-entry condition which is identical to (24). In other words, for any level of E/M c the laissez-faire cutoff quality level λ A p is socially efficient. This result, which is identical to the ones obtain by Feenstra and Kee (2008) , holds because the cutoff quality level does not appear as an argument in the social planner's objective function, but only in the resource constraint. Thus, the social planner chooses the cutoff quality level based on efficient resource allocation considerations. In the case of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) The latter is reproduced below for illustrative purposes
Comparing the zero-profit condition (28) to the socially-optimal condition (27) reveals the following. The market cutoff quality level depends on profitability considerations that are captured by the marginal markup 1 − λ −1 p . This differs from the efficient "markup" (27) which depends on the ratio between the marginal utility derived from an additional variety and the average quality of available products. Observe that the social planner and the market assign the same total cost to the product with the cutoff quality level, namely In other words, the planner cares about the average (infra-marginal) consumer, whereas the market cares about the marginal consumer. On one hand, because the marginal quality level is less than the average quality level (λ p <λ p ), the market has a tendency to overstate the benefits of introducing a new variety by charging a lower "price" and producing a higher quantity than the social planner. On the other hand, because ln(βE/M c ) > 1 and λ p > 1 the ranking between the social and market prices is in general ambiguous. Consequently, there is a divergence between the market and social valuation of the marginal benefits associated with an introduction of an additional variety, and inspection of equations (23), (24), (27) and (28) How does the market solution differ from the socially optimum solution? Figure 1 illustrates the market and efficient values of λ p and E/M c by plotting the graphs of equations (24), (27), and (28) under the assumption that quality levels are drawn from a Pareto distribution with scale parameter b and shape parameter κ > 0,
Assuming that quality levels follow a Pareto distribution is not essential in our analysis.
However, it makes the analysis analytically more tractable. For example, using this distribution function in (13) (27) 16 Equation (28) can be written as
17 With the Pareto distribution defined by (29), equation (27) 
−1 > 0, where the last inequality follows from the facts that κ ln(βE/Mc) − (κ + 1) > 0 and κ > 0. Differentiation of this slope with respect to λ p implies that
18 To see this, notice that the slope of the FF curve is given by d(E/M c )/dλ p = (κ + 1)(E/M c )/λ p . The slope of the SS curve, on the other hand, can be rewritten as
19 The slope of the SS curve is generally indeterminate under other distribution functions. In this case, the SS curve may intersect the FF curve more than once, and hence, might give rise to multiple socially optimum cutoff quality levels. 
Conclusion
The present paper developed a highly-tractable model of quality heterogeneity and international trade. Firms in our model face Cobb-Douglas preferences and charge prices that are proportional to the quality level of their products as in Schumpeterian growth models.
The production side of the model mimics the model of productivity heterogeneity proposed by Melitz (2003) . In our model, firms with high-quality products export, firms with intermediate-quality products produce for the domestic market, and firms with low-quality
and f e /L < 1, unless b is too low and κ is too high, as λp approaches 1 the SS curve intercept is higher than the FF curve intercept. In depicting Figure 1 , we assume that these conditions are satisfied. Also notice that when k increases the FF curve becomes steeper (assuming that b 1). In this case, the FF curve may intersect the SS curve at a point to the left of point C in Figure 1 , which implies that the socially optimum cutoff level is smaller than the market cutoff level λ A p . 21 Totally differentiating equations (24), (28) and (27) yields the marginal shifts of the FF curve
The term in curly brackets is positive, less than one, and implies that the magnitude of the SS curve shift is less than that of the FF curve.
products exit the market. This trade pattern is consistent with the findings of several empirical studies and the Alchian-Allen conjecture. Firms producing high-quality products charge high prices and enjoy high markups, whereas firms producing low-quality products charge low prices and charge low markups.
The model generates several novel results that complement those of the existing theory of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms. First, the distribution of markups, the mass of varieties consumed and produced, the real wage, and cutoff quality levels are all endogenous and determined by general equilibrium forces. Therefore, the model delivers a general equilibrium mechanism, based on endogenous markups and endogenous factor prices, which governs the impact of trade on intra-industry reallocation of resources. Second, trade liberalization (or a move from autarky to trade) raises the intensity of product market competition, increases the cutoff quality levels, increases the average markups and forces inefficient firms producing lower-quality products to exit the market. The welfare impact of trade liberalization (or a move from autarky to trade) is positive. However, the laissez-faire cutoff quality levels are socially suboptimal. The main reason behind this inefficiency is the ambiguous welfare ranking between the market and socially optimal markups. This, in turn, leaves room for welfare-improving government intervention.
A. Limit Pricing
Consider the following utility function, which is a generic version of the preferences used routinely in quality-ladders growth models, that describes the tastes of a typical consumer
where Ω denotes the set of potential varieties. Each variety is associated with two quality levels: q(λ(ω)) that can be produced by only one firm as in our model, and the low-quality (generic) version q 0 that can be produced by a competitive fringe after the original product has been produced. We assume that the low-quality version can be produced under constant marginal costs equal to the wage and perfect competition. This implies that the generic product commands a price p 0 = w = 1. In addition, since both goods adjusted for quality are identical, a consumer spends her income only on the good with the lower quality adjusted Therefore the consumer is indifferent between the two quality versions of the product if and only if p(λ) = λ. If the high-quality producer sets a limit price p − ε, where ε is infinitesimally small, she maximizes profits and drives the competitive fringe out of the market. Following the standard practice of quality-ladders growth models, we assume that even if ε = 0, all consumers buy the high-quality version of each product even if in principle they are indifferent between the two quality versions of each good.
B. Productivity Heterogeneity
Following the spirit of Taylor (1993) , suppose that the utility function of the representative consumer is given by
The demand for a typical variety is q(ω) = EL/(p(ω)M c ) as in the main text. Assume that firms discover new varieties associated with a productivity level λ(ω), and once the product is developed and sold in the market it can be produced by a competitive fringe with marginal and average costs equal to the wage w = 1. The marginal cost of a firm with productivity level λ(ω) is 1/λ(ω). Consider the profit flow of a firm with productivity λ which charges the limit price w − ε = 1 − ε, where ε → 0, to drive the competitive fringe out of the market. The profit flow is given by
which is identical to (4) in the main text. Limit-pricing strategies and Cobb-Douglas tastes generate a model with heterogeneous productivity and markups: More productive firms charge lower prices and earn higher profits as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) .
C. Proof of Lemma 1
Substitute λ −1 p > λ −1 in the integral expression of equation (13) 
D. Proof of Proposition 2
We will prove that H(λ i , α) defined in (18) Differentiating H(λ i , α) with respect to λ i yields the desired result: The property ∂H/∂λ i < 0 in conjunction with equation (9) imply that the left hand side of (17) is strictly decreasing in the production cutoff quality level λ i .
The full characterization of the solution requires the evaluation of the left-hand-side of (17) when λ p approaches its boundaries. Equation (9) implies that at the lower bound of the production cutoff quality level (λ p = 1) the export cutoff quality level equals the per-unit trade costs (λ x = τ ), whereas as λ p approaches its upper bound (λ p → k), λ x approaches infinity (λ x → ∞). The following conditions characterize the limiting behavior of and H(λ p , 1) and H(λ x , τ ) : In summary, the left-hand-side of (17) is always positive and defines a negatively sloped curve starting at infinity as λ p → 1 and reaching the value H(k, 1) as λ p → k. The righthand-side of (17) equals to δf e /f p and it is independent of λ p . Therefore, the existence of a unique cutoff quality level λ p > 1 is guaranteed for a sufficiently high value of δf e /f p . Formally, a sufficient but hardly necessary condition for the existence of the unique equilibrium is that H(k, 1) < δf e /f p . It is then obvious from equation (9) that the unique production cutoff quality level λ p determines the unique export cutoff quality level λ x such that λ x > τ and λ x > λ p .
